the liberation of Palestine in close cooperation with the wider Arab world's struggle with Israel under the leadership of Egyptian president Jamal Abd al-Nasir. Although Shuqayri offered grand and belligerent oratory about the liberation of Palestine, the PLO's Palestine Liberation Army forces were safely stationed with the armies of host Arab states.

The humiliatory defeat inflicted on the Arab regimes by Israel in June 1967 led to Shuqayri's political demise. Like Abd al-Nasir, he was tarnished by the disaster. This and the growing criticism of his leadership led Shuqayri to resign as PLO chair on December 24, 1967. He lived in Cairo and Tunisia for the remainder of his life, until his death in Jordan while seeking medical treatment. Shuqayri was buried in the Jordan valley within sight of Palestine, in the cemetery adjacent to the tomb of one of the heroes of the seventh-century Islamic conquests, Amir bin Abdullah bin Jarrah (known as Abu Ubayda).

He wrote several books, including, in 1969, *Arba'a Aman fi al-Haya al-Arabiyah wa al-Dawliyyah* (Forty years in Arab and international life).

Michael R. Fischbach

**Shuqayri, As'ad**

Religious figure, politician

1860–1940  Acre

After studying with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh at al-Azhar University in Cairo in the late 1870s, As'ad Shuqayri served as civil and religious judge in the Ottoman judiciary in Shafa Amr, Galilee, and al-Ladhaqqiya in Syria. He bore the title al-Shuykh as a result. Shuqayri moved to Istanbul in 1905 and served as Sultan Abdülhamit II's librarian. He also was a judge in Adana, in Anatolia.

Shuqayri was elected to the Ottoman Parliament representing Acre in 1908 as a high-ranking member of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), for which he opened a branch in Jerusalem. He was elected to the parliament again in 1912. During this time, he was an opponent of independence and separation from the Ottoman empire. During World War I, he was appointed mufifi for the Ottoman Fourth Army under the command of the CUP leader Jemal Pasha, who used harsh measures to suppress Arab nationalists. The Palestinian press accused him of encouraging Jemal's actions. He settled briefly in Adana after the war. After returning to Haifa, he was arrested as a former Ottoman official by British authorities and imprisoned in Alexandria, Egypt, for fourteen months. He returned to Acre in 1921 after his release.

Although basically an Ottoman traditionalist opposed to Arab nationalism, he became involved in Palestinian politics during the Palestine Mandate. Particularly hostile to the leadership of al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni in the Supreme Muslim Council after 1922, he became a pillar of the Nashashibi family-led Opposition faction in northern Palestine.

Michael R. Fischbach

**Siniora, Hanna**

Journalist

1937– Jerusalem

Hanna Siniora studied pharmacy in India and received a B.S. in 1969. He headed the pro-Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Jerusalem daily newspaper al-Fajr after the kidnapping of the paper's editor in 1974 and was its editor in chief from 1983 until its demise in 1993. He founded the English-language weekly al-Fajr Jerusalem in 1980. In the 1990s, Siniora founded the Jerusalem Times and the New Middle East. He heads the European-Palestinian Chamber of Commerce.

Michael R. Fischbach

**Six-Day War**  See Arab-Israeli War of 1967.

**Society**

Whereas the twentieth century saw the reemergence of Palestine as a separate administrative entity, nineteenth-century Palestine was, in terms of cultural and social patterns, an extension of the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. These affinities included ecological patterns, land tenure and cropping arrangements, contrast in habitat between coastal regions and highland townships, urban-rural dichotomies, and a relatively autarkic village economy.

Like Anatolia, Syria, and Mount Lebanon, Palestine was dominated numerically by an autonomous peasantry, a tax-farming system
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(which replaced the earlier mode of military fields), a distinct differentiation between an urban mercantile culture, and a rural communal organization of agricultural production (Firestone, 1975). Social organization and social consciousness, judging from the few narratives that survived from that period, were distinctly localized and kinship-bound (Rafiq and Bahjat, 1916). Cities and villages were joined by ties of patronage and fictional kinships.

The entry of Palestine into modernity, in the sense of its integration to the global economy and its intensive exposure to European technological innovation, has been variously periodized by the Napoleonic invasion at the turn of the century, by the Egyptian military campaign (1831-40) of Ibrahim Pasha, and more particularly by the introduction of the Ottoman administrative reforms of 1839 and the commoditization of land under the Code of 1858 (Scholch, 1993).

Toward the end of Ottoman rule (see Ottoman period, late) the Palestinian village, seemingly immobile, had gone through important transformation that affected its physical characteristics as well as its relations with the holders of power in the cities. The turn of the century heralded the harnessing of nomadic incursions to the peasantry, substantial demographic growth in the countryside, and establishment of an effective—though rudimentary—network of transportation that linked the village to regional centers and to demands of the external markets. Structurally, the period saw a radical reorganization in the land tenure system and the modes of agricultural production: from communal ownership of the land to absentee private property; from subsistence farming to monetization, commodity production, and export of agricultural yield (Owen, 1982).

The village remained the source of revenue and power, but not the seat of authority. Its big landlords, tax farmers, government functionaries, artisans, merchants, and notables were all located in the four or five major urban centers, constituting the privileged elite that had established its hegemony over Palestine (Doumani, 1995; Seikaly, 1995). Yet despite those hierarchical cleavages and disparities in wealth, Palestinian society was divided by lineage units and other forms of kinship and quasi-kinship identifications in which class formations were hardly visible. And although the city-village dichotomy permeated the consciousness of Palestinians when they reflected on groups outside their local community (as evidenced in the folkloric literature), it was nevertheless a consciousness mediated through other identification that they believed to be primary (Nimr, 1974; Owen, 1982). These were mainly regional loyalties, religious affiliations, and clan affiliations. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, with minor exceptions, the peasantry of Palestine were divided by factions based on clan alliances and relations of patronage with urban landlords and notables.

New Land Tenure System The role of the state during this period was largely confined to the management of the taxation system in order to increase its revenues, and the installation of a proper infrastructure for that purpose. In addition to the passage of legislation regulating the commercial code and laws abolishing the guilds and encouraging industrial development, a chief instrument for breaking with the “policy of provision” was the promulgation of the land code aimed at establishing private property in agriculture.

One of the main features of the administrative reforms (tanzeemat) in the late Ottoman period was that it marked the transition from a tribute-exacting mode of extraction (based on tax farming—a system of decentralized collection of taxes) to a more complex system of surplus appropriation in agriculture (Scholch, 1993). This change was dictated by the pressure exercised by the European powers on the Ottoman state to repay its debts and interests on massive loans after the incorporation of the Ottoman social formation into the world capitalist economy. The Ottoman state sought to increase its revenues from land by a process of eliminating the multazim (tax farmers), although not always successfully, and allowing for more direct access to the immediate producers (Owen, 1982). It also encouraged the formation of large landed estates with the hope of developing agricultural capitalism. The significance of land registration under these reforms is that it established a market for farm land and allowed for the transfer of this land to the hands of urban merchants.

Decline in Rural Autonomy An immediate result of the reform in Palestine was the decline in rural autonomy. This was a consequence of a series of
administrative decrees (beginning with the Land Code of 1858) aimed at the regulation of land ownership, which facilitated the dissolution of the communal musha ownership of village lands by the peasants and the rise of absentee landlordism (Tamari, 1990). But since the reform aimed at increasing agricultural productivity, it had other stabilizing results. Those included the establishment of security from external pillage in the countryside, substantial growth in the urban population, and integration of the region in a network of transportation routes and a railroad system.

Ottoman administrative reforms also contributed to the separation of the Jerusalem sanjak (which included, at that period, a majority of the population of the boundaries of Palestine after World War I) from the northern sanjaks (districts) of ACRE and NABLUS (which included the best agricultural lands). Jerusalem differed from the main urban centers of Palestine in that it was detached from its rural hinterland (Gerber, 1985). Its elite, in the main, were not absentee landlords, and were predominantly a class of urban patricians made up of administrative functionaries, religious notables (ashraf), and merchants.

Two consequences of the administrative separation of Jerusalem for local politics in the second half of the nineteenth century can be cited here: one was the relative independence of, and possibly privilege accorded to, the Jerusalemite notables by virtue of their direct relationship to the sultanate in Istanbul. This autonomy was also influenced by the interest in the Holy City (with undisguised imperialist ambitions) of the European powers, reflected by the large number of missions, legations, and other European representative offices in the city. This relative autonomy, however, had a marked negative consequence on general political life in southern Palestine, namely, the weakness of local voluntary associations for the advancement of education and social welfare—in contrast with conditions in the northern districts and Damascus, where such associations were vigorous. This weakness flowed from the strong dependence of Jerusalem on the central government (Schölch, 1993). In terms of its social economy Jerusalem’s could be characterized as having then a “parasitic” social structure: its dependence on religious endowments and international charities and its weak organic links with its surrounding village.

The other consequence of administrative separation was the intensification of factional rivalry between Jerusalem-based clans and Nablus-based clans. The roots of these conflicts extend beyond the administrative reform. Northern notables traditionally complained of the way their fate was tied to “the whims of the Jerusalem effendis” (notables)—as expressed by the Nablus historian lhsan al-Nimr. This hostility persisted even after the unification of Palestine under the British PALESTINE MANDATE (Nimr, 1974). Several decades later, when al-Istiqlal, the ISTIQAL PARTY, the only mass-based pan-Arabist party, began to mobilize Palestinian Arabs around an anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist program, it invariably encountered factional opposition from the Jerusalem clan-based parties of the HUSAWI family and the NASHASHISHI family. Those difficulties were due in no small degree to the fact that the leader of al-Istiqlal, Awni ABU AL-HADI, belonged to a family of big landowners in the JENIN (Nablus) area, but primarily to the platform of al-Istiqlal, which was critical of clan-based parties.

The social basis of clan power seems to have been associated with two interrelated features. One was the number of people that clan notables could mobilize on their side in factional struggles—a factor that was dependent, as far as peasants were concerned, on the amount of land under control of the clan head and the intricate system of patronage he concluded with his sharecroppers and semiautonomous peasants, including his ability to act as their creditor in an increasingly monetized economy. The second feature was the accessibility of the clan head and the relatives/aides to public office—hence his ability to extend services to his clients in return for their support in factional conflicts (including votes for municipal elections, which became a major arena of rivalry under British rule).

Power over the peasantry, expressed in this system of patronage, and the support of that power by the holding of public office were mutually reinforcing. Influential village patriarchs who succeeded in consolidating large estates for themselves after the dissolution of the musha system would soon send a few of their capable sons or relatives to establish themselves in the regional center or alternatively acquire a public post themselves (Doumani, 1995). It has been suggested that the power of those potentates can be measured by the
degree of transition in residence from their rural base to the district center.

Land ownership under semi-feudal conditions (leasing the land to sharecroppers through the 
*wa'il*, the landlord's agent) was not always necessary as a basis for factional power. There were cases in Palestine in which a clan's power was rooted almost exclusively in the holding of public administrative office—that is, in its ability to organize its members' skills in the service of the state, with land ownership and mercantile activities playing a marginal role (Ashour, 1948). This seems to have been the case with the Nashashibi clan, who—after the Husaynis—became central contenders for the leadership of the nationalist movement.

The challenges posed by the Zionist movement and its success in creating modern and independent Jewish institutions, as well as the inability of the colonial government to accommodate Palestinian nationalist aspirations, all compelled the machinery of factional politics to perform a role to which it was thoroughly unsuited. Although the Arab leadership was capable of effective mobilization of the masses against the British colonial presence, and for independence, dislodging the Jewish colonies would have required a radically different strategy (Shafir, 1969). That strategy would have involved the nationalist movement in a protracted struggle and class alignments that in all likelihood would erode the system of patronage on which their very power was based.

It would be a mistake, however, to think of Palestinian nationalist politics during the Mandate as based entirely on factionalism. Both al-Birgajal and the Communists had social bases (especially among urban professionals and sections of the working class) that were secular and devoid of patronage. But both were unsuccessful in challenging the factional leadership of al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Arab Higher Committee and remained marginal movements.

On the other hand, factional alliances in Palestine were remarkable in that, after the intensification of Jewish settlement, they transcended both regional divisions (especially the endemic rivalries referred to previously between the Jerusalem and Nablus clans) and religious-ethnic divisions. It is suggested, furthermore, that the urban-rural dichotomy has little explanatory value in Palestinian factional politics since faction leaders were mainly urban-based "representatives" of the hierarchical system of rural "clients" and kinsmen reaching all the way to the small peasant debtor and landless laborer.

The extended role of the colonial state apparatus after World War I paradoxically strengthened the role of the leading families of Palestine since alternative institutional mechanisms of intermediate power were absent. They became the mediators of the state to the rural population and urban poor as well as their representatives to the central authorities. Both the limitations and strengths of the factional system were demonstrated in the response of the traditional leadership to the 1936 revolt.

The spontaneous peasant uprisings that marked the initial period of the revolt compelled the two main nationalist parties—the Arab Party, representing the Husayni faction, and the National Defense Party, representing the Nashashibis—to merge in the framework of the Arab Higher Committee. However, the Husaynis' stronger links to the land, al-Hajj Amin's role as the mufti (Islamic law expert) of Jerusalem, and the National Defense Party's past record of collaboration with the British authorities, all ensured that the Nashashibis would play a secondary role on the committee.

**Class and Kinship** Among the peasantry, factional alignments were expressed during the nineteenth century and for a good part of the twentieth, within the framework of putative, or fictitious, affiliations that cut across regions, religious sets, and classes. The most important of these peasant divisions were the Qaysi and Yamani factions.

Although common to many regions of greater Syria under the Ottoman Empire, in Palestine these divisions were unique in that they persisted as forms of political affiliation a long time after they lost their (seeming) function. In Syria and Lebanon Qaysi and Yamani factions seem always to have been expressed through clan alignments (Granqvist, 1933). In the majority of cases extended families, and certainly individuals, could not belong to different factions within the same clan, but there were exceptions. Nominally these factions trace the origin of the clan to its fictitious roots in northern or southern (Yamani) Arabia during the Arab migrations to greater Syria after the Islamic conquest. In practice, however, they had the primary function of establishing the basis for
loose alliances in the event of interclan conflicts. Such alliances cut across the village-city dichotomies and often united Christian and Muslim families.

Fictive affiliations, however, do not seem to have taken the same form throughout Palestine. In a comprehensive study of Qaysi-Yamani divisions in nineteenth-century Palestine, Miriam Hoexter distinguishes two main regional patterns of clan alliances: those prevailing in the Nablus mountains and those in the central highlands. In Nablus, indigenous notables and landlords ruled the countryside, whereas in Jerusalem, the local majlis was governed by an Ottoman pasha (Hoexter, 1973).

The use of the term party (high or soft) in most references to Qaysi and Yamani factions should not obscure the tribal character of these affiliations. The divisions acted as symbols of permanent identification around which members of a clan can be mobilized to secure various (and variable) objectives of their clan heads and tribal leaders. Some social historians of Palestine have dismissed the picture of a perennial “tribal” conflict in which this factionalism has traditionally been portrayed, suggesting a framework on which Qaysi-Yamani divisions can be seen as having the objective of mobilizing the resources of a particular clan leader against the claims of rival families to gain public offices and tax farming contracts.

The decreasing isolation of the Palestinian village (cash crops, Jerusalem-Jaffa railroad, centralization of government) and the decline of the patronage system associated with the rise of share tenancy during the Mandate period affected these alignments negatively. Qaysi-Yamani affiliations lost their effectiveness as foci of clan identification when a few, more complex system of alliances was needed to meet the transformed relations between the peasantry and the urban sector, on the one hand, and the Jewish social structure, on the other. Nevertheless, they continued to surface throughout the Mandate period, and villages took account of them in public festivities lest the amassed crowds in one place should trigger latent conflicts to explode along Qaysi-Yamani lines (Scholch, 1993; Owen, 1982).

**Class Formation** While the old regional divisions in Palestine—based on administrative zones under Ottoman and British rule—began to lose their original significance, new divisions began to emerge, reflecting the integration of the region's economy into the European capitalist market. Colonial penetration also contributed to the development of a modern infrastructure, to a large extent for reasons of military strategy. By World War I, Palestine had the greatest ratio of railroad track per capita in the Middle East, although the economic impact of modern transportation was not as dramatic as in Egypt.

The building of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railroad line (later Jerusalem-Haifa, and linked to the Hijaz railway), the growth of citiculture with a European market, and the proliferation of wage labor related to the British war efforts and the employment of Palestinians in the government bureaucracy, all led to the decline of the subsistence character of agriculture and the semifeudal relations hinging on it.

Many absentee landlords who resided in the main cities, and a few state functionaries, whose wealth did not rest on land, began to reinvest their agricultural surplus in export-import trade and in light industries. A Royal Commission Report prepared during the revolt year of 1936 challenged the predominant picture of a vigorous modern Jewish industrial economy dwarfing an Arab sector based presumably on craft production. "Arab industry," the report states, "is also diversified (as Jewish Industry) and consists of some large undertakings and numerous small ones which, in the aggregate, form an appreciable contribution to the industry of Palestine" (Himadeh, 1938). The main urban industries in the Arab sector included soap manufacturing, flour milling, and production of textiles and construction material. Agrarian capitalism also flourished during the Mandate and was based on citrus plantations in JERUSALEM, Gaza, and the Ramla and Lydda regions. Olive oil extraction was the main form of manufacture in the rural sector in which wealthy peasants and landlords invested their capital—although it tended to remain primitive in its technology.

Thus, a new class of merchants and manufacturers was growing in the coastal cities of Gaza, Jaffa, and Haifa—all constituting the Mediterranean outlets of Palestine to Europe. This growth of a coastal bourgeoisie was accompanied by important demographic changes: the town
population in general, and the coastal cities in particular, increased substantially.

The city of Jaffa had the fastest rate of growth, even before the Mandate. It quadrupled its size between 1880 and 1922 alone, becoming the economic and cultural nerve center of Arab Palestine.

The 1930s also saw the beginning of large-scale rural-urban migration, which reflected both the increase in the employment potential of the cities and a rise in the agricultural labor surplus. A new regional dichotomy was emerging between the main coastal cities—centers of trade, newspapers and literary magazines, and urban Jewish migration—and the inner mountain cities (Nablus, Safad, and Hebron)—seats of conservatism and the traditional leadership. But this was not a dichotomy between the abode of the bourgeoisie and the abode of the landed classes. For unlike the landed elites, the Palestinian bourgeoisie did not behave as an integrated class during this period. This was related to the composition of the mercantile and manufacturing entrepreneurs in Palestine. As in the neighboring Arab countries, the bourgeoisie was a stratum with strong kinship and social bonds linking it to the landed classes. Those entrepreneurs who were not landholders either had patronage relationships with them or were related to them by marriage. Furthermore, most landholders found it convenient to invest their agricultural surplus in real estate transactions, construction, or posts “bought” for their sons (for instance, through marriage bonds)—in all cases, nonproductive activities.

However, this process of differentiation did not generate the growth of a significant manufacturing class. The urban elites, the class of landlords and urban notables, did not have control over the colonial state apparatus, and because of the heavy competition from the autonomous Jewish sector (which, except in the period of the boycott, had unhindered access over the Arab consumer market) the external condition for the growth of the Arab bourgeoisie did not develop. A very small portion of the agricultural surplus was invested in manufacturing enterprises. Those “landed businessmen” who did invest in manufacture (such as the Massign family, of the Nablus soap industries) were few and together were not capable of generating enough employment for the masses of dispossessed peasants, peasant-workers, and urban laborers who were looking for jobs (Owen, 1982). Those entrepreneurs were also too closely linked to the landed elite to develop their own distinct consciousness and separate ideology. Nevertheless, recent research about Palestinian investments in coastal enterprises indicate that a vigorous urban entrepreneurial class was growing in the 1940s and was having significant links with Lebanese, Syrian, Egyptian, as well as European establishments (al-Junidi, 1986).

**Flight and Dismemberment** The consequences of factionalism became evident when the main confrontation finally came about between the Zionist and Arab forces in 1948. The vertical segmentation of the Palestinian society, on which the edifice of its primordial political fabric prevailing in the 1930s and 1940s operated, was shattered from without—with the resulting physical dislocation of both the agrarian and urban communities (the Arab population of the city of Haifa, for example, was reduced by the outflow of Palestinian refugees from 80,000 to a few thousand in one week).

During the initial period of communal clashes between Jews and Arabs, which extended over the latter part of 1947 and early 1948, a substantial section of the Palestinian elite (landlords, businessmen, and professionals) constituted the majority of the tens of thousands of Palestinians who fled the country. Given the absence of an extragovernmental body in Palestinian society (equivalent, for example, to the Jewish Agency) that could coordinate the Palestinian resistance and provide basic services to a community steadily being deserted by its elites, the impending breakup of its political will was unavoidable. Coupled with the intensive bombardment faced by cities like Jaffa, Lydda, and Ramla, this exodus was a decisive factor in the collapse of the social fabric of Palestinian society and the mass desertion of towns and villages by their inhabitants.

The major dislocation that affected Palestinian society from 1948 and the disappearance of the relation of patronage on which factional politics rested compel us to look to different categories of analysis to understand these changes. Although most Palestinians remaining in Palestine still dwelt in rural districts (in the Galilee, the Triangle area of north-central Palestine, and the West Bank—but not the Gaza Strip), their collectivity can no longer
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be characterized as a peasant society: that is, a society that derives its main livelihood from agriculture and in which the family farm constitutes the basic unit of social organization. This is especially true of the rural sector of Palestinian citizens of Israel: as it was progressively incorporated into the Jewish economy, its former peasants began to relate to it mainly as wage workers. To the extent that factional politics persisted in the Arab village, it was due to the external manipulation by Israeli political parties of a traditional clan structure that was losing its viability and inner dynamic. In the 1930s, however, clan politics reemerged in parties that were ostensibly nationalist and socialist (Arab Democratic Party, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality).

As a consequence of the war the peasantry of Palestine was dismembered and relocated in three different social formations: (1) those who remained in the State of Israel, constituting a submerged underclass of peasant-workers (approximately 25 percent of the total); (2) those who became refugees in the neighboring Arab states and the remaining regions of Palestine, constituting a reserve army of labor in the periphery of the major urban centers of the host countries (Ammann, Nablus, Gaza, Beirut, Damascus, Jericho and Ramallah)—together amounting to 40 percent of the total; (3) those who remained in their villages in those parts of Palestine that were appropriated by Jordan and Egypt in 1948, the West Bank and Gaza, whose social fabric was altered as a result of being incorporated, albeit in a different manner, from the refugees, into the new social formation—the latter constituting approximately 30 percent of the peasantry (Hilal, 1975; Heiberg, 1993).

The urban refugees, composed predominantly of the artisans, professionals, landowners, and traditional working class of colonial Palestine, were successfully integrated, at least at the economic-occupational level, into the Arab host countries—most notably in Jordan, Kuwait, the Gulf states, and to a lesser extent, Lebanon. It was from their ranks that the Palestinian intelligentsia, unable to assimilate itself politically into these two new formations, became an archponent of pan-Arab nationalism, and later of Palestinian nationalism. Above this intelligentsia lurks an eminently successful Palestinian bourgeoisie whose members were reconstituted from the sons of the defrocked landed elite of old Palestine and whose fortunes were accumulated in the new diaspora of Middle East oil. In every state in the Gulf they are found today among the most prominent bankers, export-import merchants, ministers, government advisers, managers of companies, and planners. Their less fortunate kinsmen swell the ranks of the professional and semiprofessional groups in these states.

The process of dislocation of Palestinian affected the different segments of the dispersed population in a variety of ways, depending on their former location in the class structure and on the social formation in which they were relocated. The term declassment itself cannot be used as an all-explanatory category for the fate of the Palestinians, especially since large groupings among the Palestinians, including a substantial segment of the landed elite, improved their standing. Others, like the peasants of the West Bank, retained their land and social fabric intact after the war of 1948 and 1967.

Declassment of Palestinians in Israel Whether substantial class differentiation has occurred among the Palestinians of Israel or not remains the subject of some controversy. There seems to be a consensus, however, that the quantitative integration of the Palestinian "underclass"—mainly rural laborers and peasants commuting daily to Jewish urban centers from their villages—has led to a qualitative impact on the relationship between Palestinian and Jewish society. In formal terms this change can be described as the transformation of Palestinian and Jewish societies from two parallel social structures into a single social structure hierarchically integrated in a relationship of dominance. Still in need of elaborate empirical substantiation are the amount and character of social differentiation that took place within Palestinian society corresponding to its progressive subordination to Jewish society.

Several ethnographic studies of the fate of Palestinian villages in Israel (such as those conducted by Khalil Nakhleh, Henry Rosenfeld, Sharif Kana'na, and Amnon Cohen) illuminate the changing social and political trends among the Palestinian population inside Israel.
In one such relationship the Israeli state, through limiting the options of political affiliation open to Palestinian villagers and tying voting behavior to the Zionist parties with material inducements for voters (jobs, and so on), reinforces factionalism in the village, especially those with a strong confessional (religious) base. Thus, factionalism here persists but in a clearly different context than the one prevailing prior to 1948: patronage today is related to access to privileges spared by the Israeli state to the Palestinian population through the Zionist parties. It has become a means for Zionist legitimation in the Palestinian sector.

An indicator of the qualitative changes in the social composition of Palestinian citizens of Israel can be observed in the shifting employment structure. The most notable shift has been the absolute decline in farm employment, from 58.2 percent in 1954 to less than 10 percent in the 1990s. But the alternative avenues of employment have been in those sectors that display a high degree of instability in work tenure (such as construction of catering), and hence in the formation of a cohesive working class. In three decades Palestinian employment in construction and public works increased considerably but also was supplanted by the emergence of a new professional and business class among Palestinian citizens of Israel.

Since the early 1980s can be seen a richer diversification in the occupational structure of Palestinian citizens of Israel, who, while maintaining their village-based dwellings and (sometimes) plots, succeeded in promoting themselves, in considerable numbers, into the ranks of the self-employed (construction subcontracting, retail, and other occupations), into professional employment (Rosenfeld, 1978: 396), and into a militant intelligentsia (trained, in part, in Hebrew educational centers) that openly identifies itself with Palestinian nationalism. Rosenfeld describes a policy of "deteriorization," based on land confiscation and aimed at maintaining the submerged underclass character of the Palestinian population, as having backfired as a result of changes emanating from the work process itself. This process has objectively diminished the class-ethnic cleavages that previously separated Jewish and Palestinian social structures within the Israeli state, and now has to be reinforced at the political level by the state.

Reviving familial rivalries was not the only means of maintaining the diminishing social cleavage between the Palestinian and Jewish population. It was also a consequence of the prolonged physical backwardness of the Palestinian village, where a majority of Palestinians continue to live. While the restrictions on village development channeled attempts at self-improvement in the direction of migrations to Jewish urban areas, village backwardness continued to create a peasant-worker underclass.

This process by which structural (socioeconomic) and institutional (political-administrative) mechanisms reinforce each other in ensuring Israeli-Jewish hegemony over the Palestinian minority is not self-perpetuating, however. Lustick has suggested such a system of control composed of three levers: (1) segmentation, the internal fragmentation of the Palestinian community that prevents them from exercising united political action; (2) dependence, the reliance of Palestinians on the Jewish economy for sources of livelihood; (3) co-optation, the selective manipulation of Palestinian factionalism, especially at the village level, by Zionist parties and institutions. Although these three components of control operate simultaneously to ensure Palestinian quiescence at the political level, they are not foolproof, as evidenced by the increasing assertions for national and local representation in the country's political system (Lustick, 1980). Subsequently, the normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab countries after the peace agreements of the 1990s led to the emergence of demands for equality that were atomized and based on individual self-enhancement by the new professional class, rather than collective equality in citizenship for the Palestinian minority.

This process of declassification characterized the status of Palestinians in Israel for most of the first three decades after the state was established. However, almost all Palestinian citizens of Israel are landless, and an increasingly significant proportion of those who are landed have used their village base to challenge their submerged class structure. Yet the fact remains that a considerable section of the Palestinian wage-earning population in Israel was, and to a large extent still is, dependent on employment in relatively unskilled and unstable occupations (construction, the services,
and seasonal agriculture) and suffers from the institutional obstruction by the Israeli economy of the emergence of viable Arab enterprises and a professional stratum (for example, through unofficial quotas on the number of available seats for Palestinian students in the scientific departments in Israeli universities that prevailed until quite recently). But such dependence and obstruction are not defined by the rigidity of the occupational structure, or other strictly economic factors. Rather they are limited and constantly being modified by political considerations, such as the Israeli conception of "security," and the maintenance of a Jewish majority in "sensitive" fields of employment—that is, by ideologically defined factors. During the 1960s and 1970s the need of the Israeli state for a "positive" Palestinian intelligentsia (as local Palestinians who accommodate the general policies of the state were referred to) invited its opposite: the emergence of an oppositional intelligentsia that has contributed effectively since the early 1960s to the opening of the universities and other previously closed avenues of employment and mobility to a new generation of Palestinian youth. The privatization of the corporate economy during the 1980s and 1990s opened further opportunities for mobility to Palestinian professionals and entrepreneurs.

The position of those refugees has been described succinctly by Elias Sanbar as "expulsion for the means of production." Until 1982, when the Israeli invasion of Lebanon shattered the social fabric of the Palestinian community, wage labor in the refugee camps supplemented United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and other stipends from migrant relatives. Together with Kurdish and illegal Syrian migrants, as well as Lebanese Shiite farmers from the south, the Palestinians constituted a competing source of cheap and expendable labor for local Beirut industries. A comprehensive survey conducted in a Beirut camp on the eve of the civil war confirms this position. Tall al-Za'tar, which was destroyed and many of its inhabitants massacred by Phalangist forces in 1976, was not untypical of urban refugee camps such as those situated in Amman, Damascus, Zarqa, and Irbid (it had certain features, however, that set it apart from those camps: for example, it contained a substantial proportion [23 percent] of non-Palestinian refugees, and it had a considerable number of Palestinian refugees of pastoral nomadic background, mainly from the Hula region). The camp, located in East Beirut in a district containing 29 percent of all Lebanese manufacturing industries, employed 22 percent of the total labor force and absorbed 23 percent of the industrial capital investments in Lebanon (Sanbar, 1984).

Even in a labor force dominated by "lumpen" elements, a considerable degree of social differentiation prevailed. Besides the substantial number of peddlers and itinerant laborers, the camp population includes a large number of shopkeepers, drivers, teachers, artisans, vegetable peddlers, and other semiprofessionals (such as nurses). The camps in addition had a number of contractors and medium-sized merchants who lived in their periphery, some of whom had become Lebanese citizens. A limited degree of occupational mobility was enhanced by the availability of free university education to refugee students.

Unemployment figures, though high, were surprisingly lower than those for the Lebanese labor force, even when seasonal fluctuations are taken into account. But there is an important difference: Palestinian refugees constitute in their majority former peasants who have lost their lands and whose residence in Lebanon, by virtue of their
insecure legal status, is far more vulnerable than that of indigenous migrant peasant-workers. The latter, a considerable number of whom have access to land or to relatives with land, can cushion the impact of recession, or individual unemployment, by periodic return to their villages. But the situation after the eviction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanon after 1982 has changed much of this picture, and the situation of the camp refugees has become much more tenuous since then, with significant trends of individual household migration to the Scandinavian countries and Canada recorded.

It was this situation of social and economic marginality that established the camp refugees as the bearers of the “cult of return” (al-awda) to Palestine as the core of their political ideology, and it was from their ranks that the fighting cadres of the various contingents of the Palestine liberation movement were recruited. The cult of return and the organization independence of Palestinian movements that it entailed, however, were not always free of self-imposed political restrictions. Both in Jordan and in Lebanon the Palestinians entered into various forms of alliances with the local forces in order to face the repression of the national authorities—but the conditions under which the Palestinian refugees lived and worked rendered these alliances much weaker than if they were fully integrated in the host countries.

But although the effective social base of the PLO existed in Jordan (1967-71) and Lebanon (1971-82) among its refugee camps and rootless intelligentsia, its political constituency was dispersed in several social formations, throughout the Arab World and the State of Israel. As the quest for nationhood altered the movement’s ideological direction, from the right of return to the quest for sovereignty, and from total liberation to limited statehood, so did the PLO’s political center of gravity begin to gravitate from its diaspora to those segments of Palestine that remained “intact” in the West Bank and Gaza.

The West Bank and Gaza Strip: The Logic of Old Hierarchies The conditions of declassment described for dispersed refugees in urban Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan do not take into account the fact that close to half the Palestinian people still live in (historic) Palestine—integrated since 1967 through common Israeli rule—most of them residing in relatively stable communities, in or near the place of their birth. Only in Gaza do refugee camps constitute a slight majority (around 55 percent) of the population. In the West Bank they are less than 20 percent, and in the Galilee and the Triangle refugees (though not living in camps) constitute less than 15 percent of the total Palestinian population. Furthermore, most of the remaining Palestinians living in other parts of the state of Israel (villages around West Jerusalem, the Negev (Naqab), the Lydda-Ramla area, and Jaffa) have retained their places of residence (Zureik, 1979).

What are crucial to the Occupied Territories are the manner in which the Palestinian labor force was incorporated into the Israeli economy and—since 1994—the emergence of the Palestinian national economy under the aegis of the Palestinian Authority (PA). In the three decades of Israeli rule over the territories Israel has engineered the integration of the West Bank into the Israeli economy. Until the Gulf crisis this process involved the employment of nearly half the Palestinian labor force in Israeli enterprises on a daily basis and the opening up of Gaza and the West Bank as markets for Israeli commodities. Of those workers involved the overwhelming majority were of peasant origin (73.2 percent were rural-based, as opposed to 26 percent evenly divided between urban and refugee residents), but few of them today are agriculturalists (Hilal, 1975; Tárik, 1990; Kimmerling and Migdal, 1993).

Israeli rule did give rise to a stratum of war profiteers—connected mostly with labor contracting, construction, and real estate transactions. But it did not change qualitatively the character of the local middle classes. Any growth effects it may have had were probably canceled by the desertion of sectors of the commercial bourgeoisie to Jordan after 1967. Israeli-Palestinian joint enterprises emerged in the form of subcontracting firms (in textiles and construction), but their growth rates soon declined after the late seventies, probably as a result of the impact of political uncertainty on business transactions. Employment in Israel, the most crucial variable in this connection, did create a new stratum of workers from urban refugees and surplus rural labor.
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The diversity between Gaza and the West Bank is rooted partly in the different forms of agricultural production (the predominance of capitalist citrus plantations in Gazan agriculture as opposed to small and medium-sized farms in the West Bank), and partly in the massive weight of the refugee population in Gaza. But it is also related to the nature of Jordanian and Egyptian rule: between 1948 and 1967 in those two regions (Nakhleh and Zureik, 1981).

The West Bank escaped the destruction of its landed-commercial elite and underwent a pattern of limited structural mobility in its occupational and class composition. The Jordanian army and bureaucracy, the expansion of the educational system, and a high rate of out-migration (the latter supplementing a sizable portion of household income), all combined to modify the direction of social change in a different way from that experienced by Palestinians who remained in Israel and by Gazans under Egyptian rule.

Mediation of Israeli Rule On the surface the difference between the West Bank and the Galilee would seem to be the degree of integration within Jewish society, which obtains as a result of—among other factors—the civic enfranchisement of the Israeli Palestinian population (tenuous as it is) into the state of Israel, and conversely, the colonial relationship between the state and the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. This is admittedly a controversial position, for there are those who argue that the difference is one in the degree of colonial domination between the two communities, rather than one of qualitative dichotomy. What this problem amounts to is how one interprets the nature of mediation in Israeli rule in the two Palestinian communities before the establishment of autonomous rule in 1994.

In the Galilee, where 60 percent of Israel's Palestinians are concentrated, this mediation is articulated through a relatively vigorous civil society: that is, through the system of political parties, local councils, clan alliances, and a personal petiotic network of favoritism that permeates these agencies. The structural foundation of this mediation is the occupational integration of the Palestinian labor force in the Jewish economy. A considerable degree of coercion and intimidation is nevertheless used to supplement those institutions in order to guarantee the acquiescence of Palestinians to Israeli Jewish society whose raison d'être excludes them (as Arabs) from its policy. But coercion, since the abolition of the military government in 1961, has been a secondary mechanism of political control. In the West Bank and Gaza, by contrast, mediation of Israeli rule until 1994 has proceeded primarily through the machinery of the military government. The use of systematic physical coercion to maintain Israeli hegemony has far exceeded that used among Palestinian citizens of Israel during the formative years of the Jewish state, when the military government ruled supreme in the Galilee (1948–66). Despite the presence of similar structural trends of integration at the economic level between the two regions of Israeli control, the difference cannot be attributed simply to the missing constitutional factor, that is, the enfranchisement of Palestinian citizens of Israel and its absence among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. This situation continues today despite the granting of Palestinian identity papers to residents of the West Bank and Gaza (1994).

One important factor that may explain the different responses to Israeli rule in the two regions is their social composition. Whereas the West Bank has maintained its rural and urban hierarchies, albeit in a modified form, Galilean rural society had lost its original landed elites and intelligentsia and had, therefore, to deal on its own with overwhelming odds (Nakhleh and Zureik, 1981). The continued links between West Bank Palestinians and the Arab world, through Jordan, provided that society with a network of commercial, political, and cultural ties that were denied to Palestinian citizens of Israel and drastically curtailed their political options.

We have traced the consequences of dislocation of traditional agrarian Palestine and the emergence of three distinct social formations in which the remnants of that society are embedded today. The centrality of the West Bank (and Gaza) in those formations lies in two aspects of this configuration: it is the only segment of historic Palestine in which agriculture constitutes a critical component of the region's political economy, and it is the arena in which Palestinian sovereignty is being contested today. In contrast to the predicament of the Palestinians in the Israeli and neighboring
Arab formations, West Bankers were the least subject to the convulsions in social structure that Palestinians underwent elsewhere. They alone have retained a semblance of a social order that bears continuity with the nation’s historic past. Only there is a Palestinian peasantry, divorced from its coastal landlords and urban elite, still entrenched in the highlands of the West Bank mountains and in the valleys of the Jordan. But since the “divorce” was accomplished by a massive population transfer, reimposed on its traditional order by changes in the nature of its hegemonic elites and by its reintegration into the framework of three considerably different societies (the Jordanian, Egyptian, and Israeli), one cannot treat the remaining society and peasantry as a reduced segment of the original whole.

**The Intifada: Social Consequences**

The Intifada of 1987–1993 was a sustained grassroots movement of civil insurrection against Israeli rule. The nationalism of the Intifada, and its broadly (and unclearly) defined objectives of national independence, succeeded initially in mobilizing hundreds and thousands of people in acts of civil disobedience against Israeli control. As the years progressed, however, and with increased Israeli repression against the rebellion, the movement began to lose its mass base and was confined to street action against the army by bands of activists.

Of all the social consequences of the rebellion, the most visible was the massive involvement of youth and children in spontaneous acts of resistance to the colonial forces. Tens of thousands of young people, including students, children below age sixteen, and lumpen elements in refugee camps and urban areas, were mobilized. Many of these youths were outside the arena of organized political groups and were eventually mobilized by political groups as well as in the form of enraged street bands that had a rather tenuous political relationship to the national or Islamic movements (Nasser and Heacock, 1991). Although their main target was the Israeli army, border police, and settlers, the main consequence of their activity—as far as social structure is concerned—was to challenge traditional parental authority prevalent in Palestinian society.

This social dynamic was already observable from the early 1960s with the economic independence of young people, including young women, set in motion through the breakup of the economy of the traditional house as a result of work demands outside the family farm and the family business, and the massive expansion of educational institutions—at the primary, secondary, and university levels.

This challenge to the traditional authority of the Palestinian family took several forms during the Intifada. Young people, including women, found legitimate justification for spending prolonged periods outside their homes, and therefore away from the controlling authority of the parents (escape from arrest, organizing activities, and so on). Parental authority was challenged directly by youth claims for a higher authority consecrated by political commitments to their political groups and therefore to the “national cause.” These claims were furthermore deemed acceptable and legitimate by society at large; quite often public pressure overrode narrow family concerns for the safety and (in the case of women) honor of the family. Even in mourning quite often the political group took over the tasks of the family is organizing and receiving ritual condolences.

One of the most intimate domains of family control was the choosing of marriage partners for their children. Increasingly this task was invaded by considerations of political unions dictated by political expediencies, security, and even love born in the “heat of struggle.” Although the rate of such marriages should not be exaggerated, they should not be discounted as a social—as opposed to an individual—phenomenon.

Against this challenge to the authority of the Palestinian patriarchy an opposite trend emerged during the Intifada: in many villages and refugee camps women are married off earlier and quicker, in order to preempt their involvement in political activity. Many young men took advantage of the regime of social austerity ushered in by the social uprising, including the lowering of the mahir (bride price) and the cancellation of expensive wedding ceremonies, to marry cheaply and early. The result, as can be gleaned from religious court records, was an approximate drop of two years in the average age of young women at marriage as compared with that in pre-intifada days. These early marriages mean two things: higher fertility rate (now incorporated into a national cult of
procreation) and tighter control over the social life of young women, who had little chance of a public life before marriage. 

The generalized proclamation of independence of youth should be seen in this context as primarily a male phenomenon, and one that often exercises itself as an agency of control over the mobility of women: either in the context of early marriages, or, as in refugee camps, in dictating the dress codes and free movements of female relatives. But this independence is not expressed only in the negative act of control over women. It has a twin emancipatory and anomic function: emancipatory in the sense that parents no longer control the activities of their (mostly) male children—either at home or in the street.

One consequence of this malaise is that the self-discipline inculcated by the school systems has all but disintegrated at the primary level and has been weakened considerably at the secondary and university levels. Another consequence is that the mass political parties (including the religious movements) have lost their organizational control over enraged youth, who often claim titular affiliation to their leadership.

The Reassertion of Family Control Despite these features of social anomie associated with the Intifada, the Palestinian family has displayed substantial resilience. As in the aftermath of the 1948 war (and probably during the 1936 revolt) Palestinians fell back on family resources to protect themselves from the loss of control of the world surrounding them. Among peasants this meant rejuvenation of neglected lands. In the urban context it meant the strengthening of the family firm and domestication of resources. In both cases an internal division of labor was reasserted in which the weakened extended family regained many of its eroding functions. During the Intifada we witnessed an enhanced role for the family shop in the cities and the attempt to revive the marginalized family plot in highland dry farming—which was in an advanced state of neglect as a result of the movement of labor from the village to urban construction sites.

But it would be premature to regard these trends as constituting a social counterrevolution, since the involvement of young people in the labor market outside their homes produced a lifestyle and individual predispositions that were very hard to roll back. It would be more accurate to see this trend as acting as a cushion against the uncertainties of economic upheavals generated by the critical combination of Israeli repression, the Gulf Crisis, and the restrictions of movement that accompanied the Intifada. It is in the realm of these attitudes that we should try to locate the persistence of traditionalism or its decline.

Cultural Resistance and Disengagement The Intifada witnessed a series of organizational efforts leading to the emergence of a new civil society in Palestine. We can distinguish two periods of cultural resistance: (in the 1970s, and during the Intifada) that generated forms of self-identity that distinguished Palestinian social life from that experienced by the exile communities. In both cases the implicit objective (made explicit during the Intifada) was to disengage from the network of control established by the Israelis over their subject population.

During the 1970s cultural resistance took several forms, among them the revival of traditions of music and theater that was localized and independent of currents in the Arab world—inspired to a large extent by motifs drawn from Palestinian folklore and the emergence of several voluntary youth movements in community work, mostly linked to university student unions. Much of these movements were inspired by a radical perspective of uniting intellectual labor with manual labor and were in fact so successful that they were incorporated in the official university curriculum of three universities. A third form was the movement for adult education, whose objective was to wipe out illiteracy among working adults and introduce rural women to functional literacy. The movement succeeded in mobilizing hundreds of university students to roam outlying districts and set up makeshift classes. It also introduced innovative techniques of adult education through learning by doing and use of specialized adult texts.

Eventually this movement was stifled by institutionalization: it became part of the regular routinized university curriculum and "higher committees" of adult education, losing its voluntarist character. The loss of momentum and dispersal of the cultural movement of resistance to a large extent, however, resulted from the decline of
the political movement after the withdrawal of Palestinians from Lebanon.

The parallel movement during the Intifada was similarly based on a strategy of disengagement from Israel, in the form of boycott of Israeli commodities and its civil administration, and the building of alternative organs of power in anticipation of statehood. The movement was given critical momentum when the Israeli army closed all schools; even kindergartens were closed by military order.

Popular committees were organized by clandestine groups in urban neighborhoods throughout the West Bank and Gaza to fulfill the educational needs of locked out pupils. Since the number of university-trained Palestinians was monumental (on a per capita basis it compares with that of Israel—fully one-third of high school graduates were enrolled in universities and polytechnics), there was an abundance of available teaching staff. At the university level classes were convened in hotels, mosques, churches, and homes. Education acquired the status of a subversive activity.

This secret ritual allowed by interventions in the range and character of traditional curriculum, as well as innovations in the style of instruction and learning process, to a degree that was unimaginable in supervised teaching. Students began to rely on a higher proportion of home study. Teachers allowed, by necessity, for a wider range of initiative and participation by their pupils.

In a few cases independent educational committees, primarily in the private sector, undertook to write and disseminate alternate textbooks. Calls were made to revamp the standard general examination, which determines the fate of all high school graduates, but those were soon terminated by popular hostility to the idea and the sheer administrative complexity of the scheme.

This experiment at reconstituting the educational system was short lived. The popular committees, the semiclandestine units that directed neighborhood activities during the years 1988 and 1989, were crushed by brute force through a series of house-to-house searches, arrests, imprisonments, and deportations. Mass organizations that survived the police hunt directed their main activities at non-cultural activities, such as peasant cooperatives, women’s associations, trade union activities, and straightforward political action.

Since the popular committees were seen by the Israelis (and particularly by the then-minister of defense, Yitzhak Rabin) as the backbone of the insurrection, no distinction was made between cultural forms of resistance and other types of street action. The movement had to be crushed as a whole, beginning with its “soft” infrastructure—the neighborhood committees.

Within the movement itself there were internal factors that mitigated against the success of educational reform. Traditional school curricula and established procedures of examination were the gateway for career advancement in society. Any attempt to tamper with this system was fiercely resisted not only by the educational establishment but from the ranks of the national movement itself. The excessive factionalism of the youth movement meant that any attempt to address substantive issues in the educational system were seen as divisive and premature (that is, that such issues should be handled by an independent state institution). Underneath this resistance to radical reform was the unwillingness of any wing within the movement to tackle the thorny problem of introducing changes in curriculum, methods of teaching, or examination that would require self-discipline of the student population; this was seen as diversionary within the resistance movement. Parents’ committees were hardly sympathetic to an experiment that they saw as disrupting their children’s chance for social advancement by tampering with the “rules of the game.”

The movement for cultural renewal espoused by the popular committees in the first part of the Intifada, like its predecessor in the 1970s, was aborted by a combination of official repression and the internal reticence and conservatism of the nationalist movement.

The Intifada succeeded in planting the seeds of future emancipatory cultural politics. In contrast to the experience of the Algerian revolution, it had an implicitly Gramscian conception of power that is forged before independence and toward independence. But this conception—as we have seen—is contentious within the movement as a whole, and there is no guarantee that it would be implemented. At the core of the crisis is a system that has ceased to deliver on its earlier promises, both at the level of being a vehicle of class mobility (because of the archaicism of its curriculum) and at the level
of improving the status of its practitioner (because it is no longer relevant to the needs of society).

Achieving statehood was seen as a precondition for generating much-needed educational reform. But as the experience of other colonial countries clearly attests, it was a necessary but not sufficient condition.

**State Formation: New Social Dynamics**

Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank urban and rural areas, which commenced with the signing of the Interim Palestinian-Israeli Agreement in the winter of 1995, created a new dynamic between the Palestinian social formation and its diaspora. The return to Palestine of PLO cadres with Yasir Arafat, the creation of a huge bureaucracy and a public sector, and the partial return of Palestinian investors from abroad, all contributed to the consolidation of a new regime that has shifted the political, social, and ideological (but not the cultural) weight of Palestinian society to the country.

The election in 1996 of the eighty-eight member Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) created new possibilities for a diversified political system in which the arbitrary tendencies of the executive would be tempered by the elected council. The new nascent state-to-be, however, displayed several authoritarian features: a multiplicity of security organs unfettered by due process, extralegal security courts, state monopolies not subject to legislative accountability, and a draft basic law that remained unratified by the executive.

By the late 1990s a new social dynamic began to emerge in Palestine, one in which the strain was no longer between the "external" and the "internal" elements, but within society. The contours of this tension are already taking form in the manner in which civil society is reformulating itself: the assertion of community-based groups to defend their autonomy against the encroachment of the state, the struggle for a free press, the degree of autonomy afforded to the judiciary, the independence of the academic establishment, the nature of legislation in the Palestinian state, and so on. Behind it lies the protracted struggle of Palestinian society to wrest control over its remaining territories from the remnants of Israeli occupation and the settlements that were established throughout the West Bank and Gaza.

The second intifada, known as al-Aqsa Intifada, which erupted in September 2000, was in many ways a culmination of political and social processes that had begun taking place in the proceeding years. Among many Palestinians, deep and widespread disillusionment with Israel, the PA, and the Oslo Peace Process at large had, by that time, been building.

The failure of the July 2000 Camp David Summit (with Arafat, Ehud Barak, and Bill Clinton) to produce a final status agreement served a final blow to what had seemed to many as an already doomed peace process. A few months later, the visit of the Israeli opposition Knesset leader Ariel Sharon to al-Haram al-Sharif (known to Jews as Temple Mount) triggered a Palestinian reaction, to which Israeli military and security forces responded with excessive use of force. In the first few days of the violence, thirteen Palestinian citizens of Israel were killed by Israeli police—an episode that was to serve as an important turning point in Palestinian-Jewish relations within Israel.

Since September 2000, mutual violence has been escalating, reaching levels unprecedented in Palestinian-Israeli relations. The al-Aqsa Intifada has had detrimental effects on Palestinian society and has left no family or community unaffected, whether by direct violence or by other forms of structural violence. Between September 2000 and June 2004, more than 3,000 Palestinians were killed and more than 25,000 were homeless. Hundreds of dunums of land were confiscated, and thousands of olive trees—the source of livelihood of thousands of families—were uprooted.

In March 2002 Israeli military forces began systematic incursions into Palestinian cities, villages, and refugee camps, in effect reoccupying many of the areas from which they had withdrawn during the previous years as part of the Oslo process. The infrastructure of Palestinian civilian life was severely damaged. In all the conquered cities, basic services supplied to people by the municipalities were disrupted; the centers of authority, such as police stations, security organizations' headquarters, government offices—even Ramallah's Bureau of Statistics—were destroyed or severely damaged, as were NGOs and other civil society institutions. Land records and building permits were destroyed. At the education ministry, often accused by Israel of incitement, fifty years of
final-exam results were lost. While many institutions have continued to function in spite of the situation, they have suffered a harsh blow.

During the intifada, Palestinians have suffered severe restrictions of movement not only into Israel but also within the West Bank and Gaza. In Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron, and other cities and villages, Palestinians were kept under curfew for months at a time, able to leave their homes briefly for a few hours every few days.

More than 160 Israeli military checkpoints were erected (many of which were not even guarded with forces), chopping up the roads between Palestinian cities and causing irreparable harm to Palestinian daily life and economy. Journeys between relatively close Palestinian cities, if possible at all, now take hours, and special permits are often required to move within the West Bank and Gaza, let alone into Israel. These restrictions of movement have had detrimental effects on women in labor and other Palestinians trying to reach urgent medical treatment, in some cases resulting in deaths.

Checkpoints have particularly affected the freedom of movement of Palestinian youth, who have faced restrictions traveling to and from school or university. In 2002, conditions were so bad by the second month of the school year—because of checkpoints as well as school closures and curfews—that, according to UNICEF, 226,000 children and 9,000 teachers could not reach their schools. University students have also been affected by the checkpoints, and academic life has been severely disrupted. Overall, the education of an entire generation of youth has suffered a harsh setback.

The Palestinian economy, too, has been severely affected by the checkpoints. For one, Palestinian access into Israel for jobs has been restricted. Moreover, internal checkpoints (that is, those between Palestinian towns) have also restricted Palestinian employment within the Occupied Territories. In addition, checkpoints restrict movement of goods, and, in the case of products such as fresh produce, this often results in spoilage. In sum, the checkpoints and Israeli sieges have been largely responsible for the current unprecedented rates of unemployment (over 53 percent in the Occupied Territories combined, with Gaza Strip unemployment rates significantly higher than those in the West Bank) and overall poor economic conditions in the Palestinian territories.

In addition to the checkpoints, Israel is building a separation barrier (wall/fence), resulting in the confiscation of more lands (often separating Palestinians from their own lands) and in general restricting Palestinian movement even further.

Due to the high levels of violence and the current political and socioeconomic reality, Palestinian society is suffering from deep trauma and widespread despair. Palestinians have, to a large extent, lost faith in political processes and initiatives, and at times there has seemed to be little, if any, hope for a better future. In this context, death—martyrdom, often in the form of suicide bombings—has become a real option to growing numbers of Palestinians. Many of those who have committed the suicide bombings in this intifada are the children of the first intifada—people who witnessed much trauma as children.

As a growing number of suicide bombings have been committed against Israelis in the Occupied Territories and inside Israel, these acts have often been sanctioned socially, or at least not always widely enough condemned; when they are condemned, it has often been for tactical/political reasons rather than strictly ethical reasoning. This form of cultural violence—rendering otherwise unacceptable acts acceptable under warlike conditions—stems from the direct and structural violence endured by Palestinians and at the same time is what enables further direct and structural violence to be employed. Its long-term effects on Palestinian society are yet to be seen.

At the same time, there have been Palestinians who have been vocal in their condemnation of any forms of violence that target innocent civilians. All in all, suicide bombings and other forms of violence, as well as political radicalization and growing expressions of religious extremism (seen in the rise of Hamas) are usually only the symptoms, not the core of the problem, and are the reaction to a systematic process of humiliation and a chronic state of despair.

**Inside Israel** The effects of al-Aqsa Intifada on the Palestinian citizens of Israel have been substantial. Many preexisting tensions between the Jewish and Palestinian communities and between the Israeli state and its Palestinian citizens have surfaced and been exacerbated. Distrust and mutual disillusionment between the Arab and Jewish communities
has grown, and social and economic relations between them have been harmed. This was especially evident in the first couple of years of the second intifada. Israeli and Palestinian political leadership and the community at large have been more outspoken in their support of the Palestinian people’s national struggle and at the same time more adamant about demanding national and collective (as well as civil and personal) rights for the Palestinian citizens of Israel.

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In a 2004 Israeli incursion into the Gaza Strip to destroy tunnels used by Palestinians to smuggle arms from Egypt to Palestine through Rafah, dozens of Palestinians were killed and hundreds made homeless. The Gaza Strip, which has been severely harmed during the past years, suffered yet another blow.

It is difficult to assess the deep and long-term effects the past few years will have had on Palestinian society or how this society will eventually emerge from what now seems like a deep abyss. There is no doubt, however, that the physical, economic, political, and psychological effects of the past few years on Palestinian society have been, and will continue to be, profound.

Salim Tamari, updated by Adina Friedman

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and worked to defend Palestinians arrested for alleged security violations.

A HUMAN RIGHTS activist, Sourani has served with the Palestine Human Rights Information Center and the Committee for the Defense of the Child. Sourani headed the Gaza center for Rights and Law from 1991 to 1995. Briefly arrested in February 1995 after his call for an investigation of PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY (PA) state security courts, Sourani was dismissed from the center by the PA in April 1995. Since then he has headed the Palestinian Center for Human Rights in Gaza. In May 2003, Sourani was elected commissioner of the International Commission of Jurists.

Michael R. Fischbach

SOVIET UNION

Until World War II the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) gave almost no attention to the subject of Palestine, opposing Zionism as a bourgeois-nationalist movement and generally disdaining the Arabs as pro-British. Moscow's objective after the war was to eject the British from the region, for which purpose the Soviets suspended their opposition to Zionism. While giving some support to the idea of a federal state of Jews and Arabs in Palestine, Moscow opted for the idea of partition in 1947. The U.S.S.R. indirectly provided arms and aid to the Jews in the war of 1948, blaming Arab opposition to Israel on British influence. Soviet support for Israel gradually disappeared after the departure of the British in 1948, and, after the death of Stalin in 1953, Moscow began actively supporting the Arab states against Israel. At first, however, the Soviets viewed the Arab-Israeli conflict as one between existing nations (and a convenient vehicle for their competition with the West), failing to recognize the Palestinians as a people and, therefore, refusing formal contact with the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) when it was founded in 1964.

Indirect relations with the Palestinians were begun only after a secret trip to Moscow by the PLO chair Yasar Arafat, as a member of Egyptian president Jamal Abd al-Nasser's delegation in July 1968. The U.S.S.R.'s recognition of the Palestinians as a people and the PLO as a national liberation movement followed. This change in attitude and the ensuing but gradual development of the

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Raji Sourani pursued secondary studies in Gaza and Bethlehem before studying law for a time at Beirut Arab University. He received an LL.B. from Alexandria University in Egypt in 1977, whereupon he returned to the Gaza Strip to practice law.

Sourani repeatedly fell afoul of Israeli occupation authorities in Gaza. He was imprisoned on several occasions, including from 1979 to 1982,